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Background: Karl Popper’s views about science and political 
economy remain relevant to evaluation theory and practice. 
His Open Society opus inspired pioneering contributions to 
experimental evaluation and shaped the evaluation 
discipline. Yet, his ideas are not widely known without the 
evaluation community even though populist leaders are once 
again threatening to undermine democracy. 
 
Purpose: To define the Open Society, probe its 
epistemological tenets, confirm that they remain valid as the 
foundation of evaluation practice, identify the ways in which 
the operating environment for evaluation has changed and, 
against this background, propose a policy change agenda 
relevant to the contemporary evaluation discipline. 
 
Setting: The Open Society is once again being undermined. 
Modern authoritarianism is tightening its grip. The lure of the 
strong man is once again gaining traction. The dominance of 
an international order grounded in democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law is giving way to a world in which leaders 
are pursuing narrow nationalist and vested interests. In this 
troubled context, policy making has become more complex 
than when evaluation emerged out of the ashes of World War 
II. Economic and social dysfunctions have led to extraordinary 
concentration of wealth and privilege.  Ominous 
environmental threats loom. The architecture of 
international relations designed in the mid-1940’s has 
become obsolete.  
 
Research Design: To design this commentary about the 
prospects of the evaluation discipline, the author drew on his 
personal experience as evaluation academic, international 
development practitioner, manager of the World Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Group for two consecutive five-year 
terms and senior independent evaluation adviser to 
governments and international development agencies. 
 
Intervention: As an intervention, this article adds value to 
evaluation theory and practice by showing why and how the 
Popper/Campbell mandate for evaluation needs to be 
upgraded to protect the public interest in a new operating 
environment.  Specifically, Popper’s piecemeal social 
experimentation concept should be refined to forge links 
between small scale experiments and the broader fabric of 
society. In addition, the ambiguity regarding the relationship 
between the Open Society and evaluation should be lifted 
through a reconsideration of the democratic evaluation 
model. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis: The author conducted an 
extensive review of the literature and consulted with a wide 
range of evaluation thinkers to examine the extent to which 
Popper’s philosophy remains relevant to the evaluation 
discipline. 
 
Findings: Popper’s Open Society ideas aimed at avoiding the 
rise and perpetuation of autocracy and remain highly 
relevant. But the current threats to democracy call for a more 
ambitious and detailed remit for the evaluation occupation. 
Beyond the promotion of evaluation in democracy and of 
democracy in evaluation, evaluation for democracy should be 
pursued. This implies putting value, ethics, and the public 
interest at the very center of the evaluation occupation; 
breaking free of Popper’s parsimonious piecemeal social 
engineering concept to inform systemic social reform; 
bringing peace to a methodologically divided house; 
systematic mixing of evaluation methods and models; and the 
promotion of evaluation independence through 
professionalization. 
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Karl Popper is not widely known within the 
evaluation community. Yet, he had a major 
influence on Donald T. Campbell, whose pioneering 
contributions to applied social research shaped the 
evaluation discipline from its very start (Rieper, 
2004). Popper’s perspectives on knowledge 
creation have been especially influential and his 
first and magisterial contribution to political 
philosophy (The Open Society and Its Enemies) 
addresses issues that are still central to the 
evaluation function today.  
 This article responds to Campbell’s challenge to 
“contribute to the best possible exploration” of the 
actions needed for evaluation to contribute to the 
Experimenting Society, an offshoot of the Open 
Society (Campbell, 1998, p. 37). First, I define the 
Open Society, probe its epistemological tenets, and 
confirm that the Open Society paradigm remains 
valid as the foundation of contemporary evaluation 
practice. Second, I contrast the current operating 
environment for evaluation with the context that 
prevailed when Popper and Campbell put forward 
their vision of the good society. Third, I argue that 
the current evaluation community needs to get its 
act together to respond to the threats currently 
faced by the Open Society. Fourth, I lay out a 
change agenda for evaluation designed to help 
address these threats. Fifth, I conclude. 
 
What is the Open Society? 
 
The Open Society (Popper, 2013) was an immediate 
sensation and it is still required reading in political 
science courses. First published in 1945, the two 
volumes that make up the book were completed by 
1943 when Nazi Germany was still conquering 
much of Europe. Since the tides of war had not yet 
turned, Karl Popper viewed the Open Society as his 
‘war effort’ (Schilpp, 1977, p. 91).  
 By the time the Open Society was published the 
western democracies had vanquished Hitler’s 
forces, but Popper’s classic consolidated the 
cosmopolitan democratic consensus that 
triumphed when the Soviet Union imploded in the 
late 1980s and it remains an inspiration for 
democratic activists. Grounded in Enlightenment 
values, it champions human rights, rejects the 
reactionary excesses of nationalism, and unmasks 
the risks that populist leaderships pose to life and 
liberty. This explains why its major themes resonate 
today.  
 The critical rationalist beliefs that underlie the 
Open Society influenced evaluation theory and 
practice and inspired Donald T. Campbell’s 
contributions to social research. Like Popper, 
Campbell viewed evidence-based decision making 
and the resolution of political differences through 
rational debate as essential to human progress – 
two major ways in which evaluation contributes to 
the effective workings of democracy. 
 
The Open Society has Limited Aims 
 
While Popper valued democracy, the Open Society 
does not embody a specific democratic model. 
Popper borrowed the concept from Henry Bergson 
(1935) who contrasted closed societies (static, 
immune to change, constrained by tribal, 
collectivist or religious beliefs) with open societies 
that are dynamic, responsive, pluralistic, and 
respectful of individuals.  
 Popper viewed safeguards against dictatorial 
rule as the acid-test of the Open Society not only 
because dictators tend to abuse their power but 
because, even if they are benevolent, they rob 
citizens of their fundamental rights and civic duties.  
The Open Society protects freedom of thought, 
critical debate, and pursuit of knowledge. On the 
other hand, Popper distrusted all utopian visions 
and observed that sharply contrasting values and 
principles are inevitable in a democracy:  
 
…we shall always have to live in an imperfect 
society. This is not only because even very good 
people are very imperfect; nor is it because, 
obviously, we often make mistakes because we 
do not know enough; even more important than 
either of these reasons is the fact that there 
always exist irresolvable clashes of values: there 
are many moral problems which are insoluble 
because moral principles conflict (Schilpp, 1977, 
p.92)  
 
 Concentrating on the narrow question of how 
to avoid the emergence (or perpetuation) of 
autocracy (Popper, 1988), Popper stood at the 
centre of the political spectrum. The Open Society 
is not a neo-liberal laissez faire paradise even 
though market fundamentalists hold Popper in 
high regard. Nor is Popper’s credo supportive of the 
libertarians who have long attempted to capture his 
legacy (Childs, 1976). 
 
Sound Epistemological Foundations 
 
Popper’s commitment to the Open Society, shared 
by Campbell, was epistemological rather than 
political. Eschewing any blueprint for a democratic 
society, Popper concentrated on the prerequisites 
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of human progress through knowledge creation. He 
was instrumental in debunking the positivist 
paradigm that previously held sway.  His post-
positivist stance secured widespread support and 
credibility within the social scientific community 
and made possible the advent of evaluation as a 
distinct discipline.   
First, Popper rejected the Vienna Circle view 
that there is a single reality that can be conclusively 
identified by observation even in the absence of a 
theory. Recognising that research is influenced by 
the values of investigators and by the hypotheses 
that they hold, Popper stressed the fallibility of 
human knowledge and resisted the exaggerated 
claims of social scientists who look for problems 
that fit their solutions instead of acknowledging 
that their theories are only conjectures subject to 
refutation. 
On the other hand, Popper did not share the 
constructivist belief that all knowledge claims are 
entirely dependent on social arrangements so that 
perceived truth cannot be divorced from ideological 
preconceptions. He opposed the notion of reality as 
a pure social construct wholly dependent on 
individuals’ worldviews. Nor did they endorse the 
logical positivist mental model according to which 
the existence of the external world can be verified 
conclusively or that valid knowledge claims are 
independent of the social and cultural context.  
In sum, the Popper/Campbell epistemology falls 
between the extremes. It is grounded in the 
presumption that while reality exists, it is only 
experienced indirectly and imperfectly through 
observation processes that are invariably mediated.  
It holds that the only inferences that can be 
legitimately drawn from an experiment depend on 
the articulation of refutable causation theories. It 
asserts that rational decision making in the public 
sphere can only be guided by plausible though 
fallible, context dependent knowledge derived from 
rigorous reality testing, scrupulous self-criticism, 
and principled debate. These remain foundational 
tenets for the evaluation discipline. 
 
The Dangers of Utopian Thought 
 
By and large, evaluators, a sceptical lot, embrace 
Popper’s rejection of essentialist, historicist, and 
holistic ideas that are the bedrocks of autocracy.  
Essentialism aspires to unearth the hidden nature 
of things, their eternal essence. Historicism seeks to 
discover basic laws and principles that drive 
historical change towards an ineluctable end-point. 
Holism rejects partial explanations solely focused 
on individual constituents of society.  
 Together, these beliefs negate diversity of 
opinion, favour collectivist undertakings and 
privilege sectional interests over individual rights. 
They also contribute to a predisposition to brutal 
revolutionary change irrespective of the human 
costs involved. Yet, violent revolutions driven by 
rigid utopian thinking fail to create adaptable social 
structures.  By contrast, the Open Society stands for 
gradual change, informed by critical discussion, 
and trial and error practices.  
 Thus, for Popper and Campbell, sustainable 
social progress just as scientific advance can only be 
incremental since knowledge of the social world can 
only be partial, conjectural, and dependent on free-
wheeling debate, checks and balances, and self-
correcting mechanisms. These are also the 
attributes of the Experimenting Society (1998) in 
which Campbell laid out a vision of evaluation as a 
feedback mechanism that provides rational 
guidance for political decision making towards a 
better world. 
 
The Imperative of Experimentation 
 
From this perspective, social learning, just as the 
search for scientific truth, is a never-ending voyage.  
It proceeds systematically through discrete steps 
with ample room for course corrections. The 
resulting incremental adjustments can always be 
improved upon.  Thus, Popper and Campbell 
viewed all scientific knowledge as conjectural and 
provisional. They held the view that no theory is 
safe from refutation, both in the physical sciences 
and in the social sciences.  
 Theory based evaluation that now dominates 
the evaluation field is solidly grounded in the 
scientific method as conceived by 
Popper/Campbell: the assumptions that make up a 
program theory can only be refuted through 
experimentation, the province of summative 
evaluation. Reality testing of intervention design 
and implementation is the core objective of the 
evaluation discipline – an integral part of 
accountable and responsive management in all 
sectors of society. 
 Falsification, a core premise of the scientific 
endeavour, also describes how evaluation works – 
or should work. It relies on independent testing of 
specific conjectures through systematic processes 
validated by the collective wisdom of peers. This 
intellectual stance is fully consistent with Popper’s 
post-positivist premise: while conclusive 
verification of an overarching theory cannot be 
achieved, it can be ruled out as false through 
evidence. 
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A Modest Social Agenda 
 
These epistemological ideas informed Popper’s 
worldview and they were echoed by Campbell who 
also favoured discrete problem solving through 
piecemeal social engineering. Rather than seeking 
comprehensive solutions to social problems, the 
rational agent of the Open Society makes his way 
“step by step, carefully comparing the results 
expected with the results achieved, and always on 
the lookout for the unwarranted consequences of 
any reform; and he will avoid undertaking reforms 
of a complexity and scope which make it impossible 
for him to disentangle causes and effects” (Popper, 
1944, p. 309). 
Again, this is the province of evaluation. Unlike 
social researchers, evaluators do not normally seek 
generalized answers to social problems. They 
recognize the uncertainty and risks associated with 
translating intellectual knowledge into practical 
action across contexts. They consider their main 
task to be a search for valid evidence about social 
interventions in ways that facilitate gradual, 
iterative, crablike social advances adapted to 
distinct operational circumstances.  This 
perspective underlies a conception of evaluation as 
an applied knowledge endeavour: a discipline 
dedicated to reality testing through case by case 
assessment. 
 From this perspective, sound politics just as 
legitimate science (and principled evaluation) 
require freedom of thought and the 
institutionalization of fact-based, knowledge 
generation processes. Guided by rational scrutiny 
of competing theories and initiatives– rather than 
rigid compliance with pre-conceived dogma – both 
science and evaluation are characterized by a 
contest of ideas, systematic examination of 
available evidence, a willingness to reconsider 
premises, and, when the facts warrant it, admit 
error and shift course. These are also the societal 
factors that generate an effective demand for high 
quality, ethical evaluation services. 
 
The New Operating Environment for 
Evaluation 
 
Today’s evaluation activities take place in an 
operating context where the Open Society is 
threatened. The fundamental concerns that led 
Popper to focus on the risks to humanity posed by 
the enemies of open societies remain valid, but the 
contemporary context differs markedly from that 
which prevailed in the mid-twentieth century when 
the Open Society burst onto the intellectual scene. 
Hence, adjustments to the Popper/Campbell vision 
are required. This section of the article sketches in 
broad strokes the contemporary threats to the Open 
Society and moves on to draw the implications for 
evaluation of the major challenges faced by the 
Open Society today. 
 
The Open Society is Under Siege 
 
The global diagnostic regarding democratic trends 
offered by Freedom House (2017) is stark. The 
dominance of an international order grounded in 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is 
giving way to a world in which individual leaders 
and nations are pursuing their own narrow 
interests. Modern authoritarianism is tightening its 
grip around the world through sophisticated 
strategies of repression that muzzle the press, 
undermine the civil society, and exploit divisions 
among open societies. The lure of the strong man is 
once again gaining traction.  
After two decades of major gains (from 34% in 
1986 to 47% in 2006), the share of countries 
classified as free has peaked over the past decade 
dipping down to 45% in 2016. The number of 
electoral democracies stood at 123 in 2016, two 
fewer than in 2015. For the 11th consecutive year 
2016 witnessed declines in freedom indicators that 
outnumbered improvements. While in past years 
freedom declines were concentrated among 
autocracies, setbacks in countries classified as free 
have begun to matter. Almost one-fourth of nations 
displaying declines in 2016 were in Europe.  
In this troubled context, policy making has 
become far more complex than when evaluation 
emerged out of the ashes of World War II as a 
transmission belt between the academy and public 
policy making. Simplistic views, divorced from 
reality, distort the political discourse (Nielsen and 
Graves, 2017). With growing polarization, the 
rational dispositions required to seek pragmatic 
solutions to human problems, and the tolerance 
needed to reconcile rival interests through 
principled debate, are in short supply (Abramovitz 
and Saunders, 2008).  
Doctrinal rigidity and growing religious and 
ethnic intolerance are undermining human 
security. Public frustration regarding the broken 
promises of liberal democracy has induced 
xenophobia. Referendums that displace principled 
compromises among elected representatives have 
become more frequent, a possible sign of indirect 
democracy in distress. The public sphere is 
degenerating into a spectacle of polarized, warring 
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policy stances no longer constrained by facts. Social 
media dominate public opinion and work as echo 
chambers that merely confirm biases and 
prejudices.  
 Lack of principled debate compounds the 
problem. Politically motivated disinformation 
exploits public anger and frustration. It mimics 
professional journalism and crowds out objective, 
balanced reporting. Journalists are discredited, 
intimidated, or prosecuted for doing their job. 
Absent reliable information, fruitful, open dialogue 
is stunted. Thus, the fragility of democratic regimes 
that Popper had diagnosed when he turned his 
attention from the philosophy of science to the 
philosophy of politics is again in evidence. 
 
The New Operating Context 
 
The post-World War II era was one of optimism and 
public faith in the capacity of the industrial 
democracies to improve livelihoods through 
government intervention and public investment. By 
contrast, in the current operational environment, 
the public sector has lost much of its influence. 
Earlier preoccupations regarding the excessive 
state power that propelled neo-liberalism to the 
commanding heights of policy making world-wide 
have been superseded by concerns about the 
threats that vested interests pose to policy making 
…and to evaluation (House, 2016). 
Being debt burdened, most western 
governments have become subservient to cash rich, 
tax evading, multinational corporations that have 
perfected the art of political influence. Through the 
new information technologies, trade, aid and 
migration, economic globalization has taken hold 
and marginalized the state (Collier and Dollar, 
2002).  
Multinational corporations have acquired 
enormous power. The information revolution 
combined with trade liberalization has rendered 
distance irrelevant so that borders no longer 
constrain private investment decisions. Equally, aid 
has induced developing countries to connect to the 
mighty engine of the global economy and to 
encourage foreign direct investment. They have 
become the engines of the global economy. A great 
convergence is underway. Global poverty was cut by 
more than half between 1990 and 2015 while de-
industrialization hollowed the middle class in 





Rising Public Discontent 
 
The causes of public disillusionment with the 
performance of liberal democracies are many 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Economic and social dysfunctions 
have led to extraordinary concentration of wealth 
and privilege, with the deleterious consequences 
envisaged by Campbell (1998, p. 44) who feared 
that the Western democratic capitalist model was 
vulnerable given “the role of wealth in providing 
grossly uneven weightings of some preferences over 
those of others” [and in creating] “great obstacles 
that may effectively sabotage program decisions 
genuinely based on the public good.”  
Ominous environmental threats that transcend 
political boundaries have also made the fate of 
nations inextricably linked (Kanie and Haas, 2004). 
The architecture of international relations designed 
in the mid-1940s has become obsolete (Raustiala, 
2002). Inequality has surged. Eight men own the 
same wealth as the 3.6 billion people who make up 
the poorest half of humanity, according to Oxfam 
(2017). 
 According to the International Monetary Fund 
(Dabla-Norris, Kochkar, Suphaphihat, Ricka, & 
Tsolunta, 2015, p. 4): “Widening income inequality 
is the defining challenge of our time. In advanced 
economies, the gap between the rich and poor is at 
its highest level in decades. Inequality trends have 
been more mixed in emerging markets and 
developing countries, with some countries 
experiencing declining inequality, but pervasive 
inequities in access to education, health care, and 
finance remain.” 
 
Implications for Contemporary 
Evaluation 
 
These then are not propitious times for the Open 
Society. More than ever, evaluation is needed to 
protect the public interest: it blends legitimacy with 
expertise and contributes to accountability and 
social learning in a bewilderingly complicated 
world characterized by impersonal governance 
structures, intricate supply chains, opaque financial 
instruments, and pervasive sub-contracting that 
diffuse responsibility and undermine the public 
interest. 
 
The Imperative of Adaptability 
 
There is no doubt that Popper favored democracy. 
But he did not hold definitive views about the form 
that democracy should take (e.g. representative vs. 
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direct, technocratic vs. participatory, etc.) and he 
would have stoutly resisted the hegemonic notion 
that Western society constitutes the endpoint of 
human social evolution (Fukuyama, 1992).  
 Thus, for Popper, liberal democracy was not the 
best of all possible worlds – only the best of all 
existing worlds (Jarvie and Pralong, 1999, p. 37). 
Still, he constructed the Open Society based on 
broad, tolerant, and adaptable political governance 
assumptions focused on “setting free the critical 
powers of man.” Specifically, he defined the Open 
Society as “a society based on the idea of nor merely 
tolerating dissenting opinions but respecting them” 
and democracy as “a form of government devoted 
to the protection of an open society” (Popper, 1994, 
p. 110).  
 On the one hand, the broad, nearly agnostic 
conception of governance of the Open Society has 
facilitated the practice of evaluation across all 
sectors of society and all parts of the world. This 
conception is aligned with the varied requirements 
of contemporary evaluation practice: evaluation is 
now operating in the private and voluntary sectors 
of society as well as in the public sector. 
Furthermore, evaluation is becoming more 
“international in the sense of being at the same time 
more indigenous, more global, and more trans-
national” (Chelimsky and Shadish, 1997, p. xi).  
 At the turn of the century, there were only 20 
evaluation associations in existence. Since then, the 
number has exploded: EvalPartners , under the 
auspices of the International Organization for 
Cooperation in Evaluation (IOCE), has identified a 
total of 158 associations or networks, of which 135 
are at the national level. This means that evaluation 
today must adapt to a wide variety of governance 
contexts. Its success as a knowledge occupation 
hinges on its adaptability. 
 
Towards a More Ambitious Mission 
 
Without jettisoning the pragmatic stance that has 
contributed to the adaptability of the evaluation 
discipline, Popper/Campbell’s modest evaluation 
mandate needs upgrading to address the 
unprecedented challenges faced by the Open 
Society today. To be sure, evaluation is an “art of the 
possible” that requires nimble adaptation to a 
variety of governance contexts. However, the 
current ambiguity regarding the relationship 
between the Open Society, democracy, and 
evaluation should be lifted since it is hindering 
clarity of purpose for the evaluation occupation.   
 However, prior to exploring the intersection 
between evaluation and democracy, it is 
appropriate to recognize that a more ambitious 
remit is required for contemporary evaluation. 
Updating the Open Society means breaking free of 
the parsimonious “piecemeal social engineering” 
compact to rise to contemporary social challenges. 
Incremental changes applied haphazardly will not 
be enough to achieve the social transformation 
required to make meaningful progress towards an 
inclusive democratic community (Kelly and 
Gregware, 1998).   
 While the threats that led Popper to expose the 
intellectual enemies of the Open Society are once 
again looming, the negative utilitarian stance that 
might be inferred from a wholesale rejection of 
holism runs the risk of discouraging the 
identification of high leverage interventions 
capable of triggering major shifts in economic and 
social policy. Especially relevant to today’s social 
predicament is Albert O. Hirschman’s “bias for 
hope” (1971) according to which small ideas and 
discrete interventions can be selected, sequenced, 
and aggregated to be transformative.  
 According to Hirschman, fundamental 
institutional change is more likely to be triggered in 
periods of latent crisis (such as the world is now 
going through) since they relax the constraints that 
normally limit policy makers’ freedom of action: 
where public discontent turns acute, new 
opportunities for progressive reforms arise. In such 
circumstances, a window of opportunity opens and 
“there is a special justification for the direct search 
for novelty, creativity, and uniqueness: without 
these attributes change, at least large-scale social 
change, may not be possible at all” (Hirschman, 
2013, p. 22).  
 This conception of projects as “privileged 
particles of the development process” (Hirschman, 
1967, p. 1) goes beyond Popper’s piecemeal social 
experimentation concept since it aims at large-scale 
replication. Achieving social progress on a 
significant scale requires forging links between 
small scale experiments and the broader fabric of 
society. From this perspective, the social scientist’s 
search for regularities, stable causal relationships, 
and predictable sequences should not be summarily 
dismissed since it may help identify high leverage 
social interventions suitable for upscaling or 
replication following systematic experimentation. 
 
Evaluation at a Higher Plane 
 
At a time of unprecedented and interlocked threats 
to democracy, Popper’s social tinkering remains 
relevant but only as a first step towards 
transformative change. If so, evaluations should 
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serve as policy experiments aimed at the adoption 
of far-reaching progressive reforms. This was an 
incipient premise of the Experimenting Society. 
Thus, Campbell (1998, p. 47) observed that 
evaluative “skills should be reserved for the 
evaluation of policies and programs that can be 
applied in more than one setting.” 
 In the new operating context, this aspiration 
has become an imperative and meta-evaluation 
should come center stage in evaluation theory and 
practice. But clarity in the relationship between 
evaluation and democracy is also essential since in 
the words of Seneca (2016, p. 182): “The archer 
must know what he is seeking to hit; then, he must 
aim and control the weapon by his skill. Our plans 
miscarry because they have no aim. When a man 
does not know what harbour he is making for, no 
wind is the right wind.”   
 
Evaluation of Democracy 
 
The term democracy (‘rule of the people’) is 
malleable. Views among scholars as well as citizens 
about the meaning of democracy and how it should 
be assessed vary widely. But the basic concept is so 
universally popular that all governments, including 
dictatorships, claim to be democratic. In the west, 
many variants of democracy exist depending on the 
degree to which eligible citizens participate in 
political decision making, either directly, indirectly 
(through elected representatives) or through a head 
of state.  
 By way of illustration, a broad-based consensus 
of western opinion captured by Freedom House 
(2017), a US think tank, provides a template for 
assessing the quality of democracy in different 
countries. It defines a liberal democracy as one 
that: 
  
(i) carries out free and fair elections;  
(ii) tolerates political pluralism and 
encourages participation;  
(iii) is free of corruption and operates 
transparently;  
(iv) protects freedom of belief and 
expression;  
(v) guarantees freedom of assembly and 
association;  
(vi) respects the rule of law and individual 
rights.  
 
But this template is not a universally accepted 
way of defining let alone evaluating democracy. The 
metrics used for each of the above categories while 
plausible are not self-evident; and there is no 
uncontroversial way of selecting the weights used to 
aggregate the various measures .  Most of all, the 
model fails to take outcomes into consideration so 
that leaders of authoritarian regimes argue that 
they are better equipped to deliver national 
strength, prosperity, and equity. This may or may 
not be the case: a vast literature seeking to relate 
democracy and economic growth has failed to 
uncover unambiguous associations (Sen et.al, 
2017).  
 From an international perspective, history as 
well as culture shape the government models 
adopted by various countries.  Thus, socialist 
regimes rely on a mix of centralized party control 
and direct democratic rule at the local level. They 
reject the basic tenets of western liberal democracy 
which they consider fictitious because of alleged 
wealthy elites’ control over elections and 
politicians.  
 Campbell (1998) recognized that democratic 
capitalism had major advantages and displayed 
favourable features for the establishment of an 
Experimenting Society (rule of law; frequent 
elections; pluralistic decision making) but he 
deplored the resulting ‘accumulation of great 
inequalities in individual and corporate wealth’ that 
it spawned, and he detected promising perspectives 
in Marxist theory that offered some hope for the 
advent of a truly experimental socialism (p.44). 
Thus, he did not rule out that evaluation may have 
a role in authoritarian societies since they might 
gradually evolve and eventually adopt Open Society 
principles. This remains a legitimate goal for the 
evaluation discipline. 
 
Evaluation in Democracy 
 
Fortunately, the Open Society is unconstrained by 
rigid definitions.  An ideal construct in the 
Weberian sense, it reflects the liberal, market-
oriented, democratic, cosmopolitan values that 
have also inspired the spread of evaluation across 
national borders.  According to Anders Hanberger 
(2006), democratic governance models fall into 
three categories:  
 
(i) elitist democracies where decision 
making is largely delegated to elected 
officials and technocrats;  
(ii) participatory democracies where 
citizens are active participants in 
decision making; and  
(iii) deliberative democracies where 
collective decisions are taken following 
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principled debate among free and 
equal citizens.  
 
Barry MacDonald’s (1976) useful distinction 
between bureaucratic, autocratic, and democratic 
evaluations helps to pinpoint how evaluation serves 
each of these three democracy models. 
Bureaucratic evaluation is the instrument of choice 
for decision makers in elitist democracies – as well 
as in authoritarian regimes and the private sector.  
This model dominates evaluation practice today. It 
provides unconditional support to decision makers 
who own the evaluation process and control its 
design as well as the disclosure of its findings.  
By contrast, autocratic evaluation is 
autonomous. Mostly protected by the ivory towers 
of academia, it seeks to advance social learning as 
well as provide expert advice to decision makers. 
While dictators, wealthy philanthropists, and 
corporate leaders are loath to use it, enlightened 
decision makers in elitist democracies do rely on it 
to secure reliable information about the public 
interventions that they manage.  
Finally, inclusive evaluation serves deliberative 
or discursive democracies . It takes many forms 
depending on the extent of citizens’ participation in 
the evaluative process. Barry MacDonald’s version 
merely informs debate and “promotes knowledge of 
the programme on the part of those who have a 
right to know, or the duty to advise, or the 
obligation to provide, or the power to stipulate.” It 
“stops short of advocating courses of action… 
modesty is called for” (Stake. 2000, p.100).   
 By contrast, the deliberative democratic 
evaluation model promoted by House and Howe 
(1999) is highly participatory: it includes all 
relevant stakeholders; promotes dialogue, involves 
extended deliberation processes. It is specifically 
designed to serve deliberative democracies. Finally, 
transformative, emancipatory, and empowerment 
approaches aim to level the playing field of society. 
Well adapted to civil society organizations, they are 
used by evaluators (whether bureaucratic, 
autocratic, or inclusive) whose values give 
privileged status to social justice.  
 It should be clear by now that for evaluation to 
be effective and fulfil its remit in diverse 
governance contexts an admixture of bureaucratic, 
autocratic, and inclusive evaluation models is 
necessary. Each of the three models has its 
strengths and weaknesses so that synergies may be 
tapped by combining them judiciously. Thus, 
bureaucratic evaluation enjoys low transaction 
costs and suffers from few information 
asymmetries. Improving its quality makes 
autocratic and inclusive evaluation more effective.  
 Equally, autocratic evaluation enhances the 
value of other evaluation approaches by attesting to 
the validity of their methods and providing 
alternative and expert perspectives to process. 
Finally, inclusive evaluation amplifies the voice of 
weak, neglected, underprivileged groups in the 
evaluative process (whether bureaucratic or 
autocratic) and as a result focuses attention and 
resources on the most pressing threats to the 
legitimacy of Open Societies. 
 
Democracy in Evaluation 
 
Accountability is a common requirement for all 
democratic governments. In autocracies, lower 
levels of government are also expected to be 
accountable. A major function of evaluation is to 
help ensure that promises are compared with actual 
delivery through fair, impartial, and transparent 
evaluative processes. 
Democracy in evaluation also implies validity 
of evaluation findings, objectivity of merit 
assessments, impartiality of evaluative judgments 
and transparency as well as timeliness of evaluation 
processes. Ethical guidelines address professional 
integrity, respect for the security, dignity and self-
worth of the respondents, program participants, 
clients, and other stakeholders and sensitivity to 
local and cultural concerns.  
Finally, democracy in evaluation requires 
governance structures and contractual protocols 
that protect the independence of evaluators and the 
integrity of evaluation processes. The checks and 
balances embedded in democratic decision making 
facilitate the design of appropriate evaluation 
governance structures, e.g. a reporting relationship 
to the legislature or to civil society organizations 
that operate at arm’s length from government to 
ensure unbiased evaluations of programs initiated 
and carried out by the executive branch. 
 Is evaluation today equipped to protect the 
Open Society where it is under threat or to promote 
a transition towards its advent where it remains 
elusive? Not unless the evaluation community ‘puts 
its own house in order’ to deliver on its more 
demanding mission. 
 
What is to be Done? 
 
This section highlights five overarching challenges 
for the contemporary evaluation discipline. First, 
evaluation policy directions should be reconsidered 
so that beyond democracy in evaluation and 
democracy in evaluation, the discipline commits to 
work for democracy. Second, it is high time to 
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secure a broad-based consensus about what 
evaluation is about so that it works for democracy. 
Third, the paradigm wars should be decisively 
settled to generate a united front against the 
enemies of the Open Society. Fourth, beyond mixed 
methods, evaluation models should be combined in 
ways appropriate to the context to promote the 
ideals of the Open Society. Fifth, evaluation should 
become self-managed through professionalization. 
 
Evaluation for Democracy 
 
Through the long twilight struggle that lies ahead, 
updating Popper’s and Campbell’s ideas would help 
sustain an embattled and divided evaluation 
community. Evaluation for democracy should 
complement evaluation in democracy and 
democracy in evaluation. This implies a more 
activist stance in authorizing environments that do 
not tolerate dissent and/or for assignments that are 
closely controlled by vested interests.  
In such contexts evaluators should not be 
content to operate as pliant advisers or brokers. In 
dysfunctional governance contexts they should 
assume ownership of their evaluation products and 
deserve to be backed up by professional protocols 
that protect their independence. In parallel, social 
justice models should come centre stage  
It should no longer be enough for evaluators to 
attend to their contractual obligations, focus on 
evaluation utilization, and satisfy those who hold 
the purse strings. Consultants who use evaluation 
methods without regard to the public interest 
should not be called evaluators.   
Rather than sitting on the fence, it is time for 
evaluators everywhere to make their democratic 
value commitments explicit (Greene, 1997). 
Equally, the ethical principles that govern 
evaluation should address the social inequities, 
power differentials, and human rights abuses that 
undermine the Open Society. In turn, this requires 
clarity about the nature of the evaluation 
endeavour. 
 
What is Evaluation? 
 
Definitions matter since they are the building 
blocks of theory and since theory is “who we are” 
(Shadish, 1998, p.5). Among the many formulations 
on offer, Michael Scriven’s Thesaurus definition 
(1991, p. 139) has evinced broad based support: 
“Evaluation is the process of determining the merit, 
worth or value of something or the product of that 
process".  Unfortunately, there is currently no 
consensus about the precise meaning of the merit-
worth-value trilogy.  
Merit is defined as the intrinsic value of the 
‘evaluand’ but does this refer to the value that 
accrues to an individual consumer (Scriven, 1991, p. 
382) or to compliance with quality standards 
(Scriven, 1998, p.65)? Is it instead assessed by how 
effective it is in meeting the needs of those it is 
intended to help (Patton, 2008, p. 113)?  
Similarly, worth is the extrinsic value of the 
‘evaluand’.  But is it the value to a specific 
institution or collective as per Scriven’s Thesaurus 
(1991, p. 382) or does it refer to the value to the 
larger community or society as proposed by Patton 
(2008, p. 113)? Should a more recent definition – in 
which ‘significance’ stands for importance and 
value is now embedded in worth– prevail?  It states 
that: “the discipline of evaluation undertakes the 
systematic, objective, determination of the extent to 
which any of three perspectives are attributable to 
the entity being evaluated: merit, worth or 
significance” (Scriven, 1998, p. 65). 
 These definitions are goal-free, but this is not 
how they are always interpreted. Goal-based, merit-
oriented approaches have dominated evaluation 
practice. Goal related assessments can enhance 
accountability but unless evaluation is genuinely 
independent (see below) they can be captured by 
power holders through fee dependence and 
contractual obligations. 
Since power holders, especially in the private 
sector, have usually reached their position because 
inter alia they are self-confident in their capacity to 
assess situations and committed to achieving their 
chosen objectives, they disdain speculation, favour 
certainty, and rely on quantitative indicators of 
progress to manage their programs.  
Consequently, program managers have 
welcomed the instrumental quality of goal-based, 
indicator driven evaluation and its reliance on a 
tight results chain that links inputs, outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts. Yet, as noted by Campbell 
(1998, p. 55) “the more any social indicator is used 
for social decision making, the greater the 
corruption pressures upon it” and, as stressed by 
House (1990) social validity hinges on an objective 
assessment of value from a public interest 
perspective.  
Similarly, worth assessments should confront 
the incommensurability of social preferences and 
sundry dilemmas of collective action before they 
can be considered valid for the overall society. Only 
value driven evaluation informed by ethics can be 
expected to resolve the aggregation dilemma of 
valuing interventions across individuals and 
groups. This calls for ensuring that evidence is 
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collected and interpreted in ways designed to verify 
or refute that legitimate intrinsic merit criteria have 
been met while, at the same time, ascertaining the 
extrinsic worth of the intervention from the 
perspective of the citizenry. 
 In other words, aggregating merit, and worth 
assessments from a public interest perspective 
reliant on valid ethical judgments to determine the 
overall value to the Open Society is what evaluation 
is ultimately about. Such a remit would be in line 
with Deborah Fournier’s view (2005, p. 140) that "it 
is the value feature that distinguishes evaluation 
from other types of inquiry, such as basic research, 
clinical epidemiology, investigative journalism, or 
public polling”.  
This leads to the following question: shouldn’t 
the identity of evaluation, a public service, be 
grounded in the recognition that, teleologically 
speaking, worth assessments are vital complements 
to merit assessments since, according to John 
Rawls (1971, p.24) the good is defined 
independently from the right and the right 
maximizes the good? Is this not the premise 
implied by the final, rubric directed, synthesis 
phase of the evaluation process recommended by 
Scriven (1994)?   
This phase of the evaluation process, the most 
contentious but also the most important, implicitly 
recognizes the need to combine merit and worth 
assessments (Scriven, 2016). To be sure, the 
original definition that allowed free standing merit 
or worth assessments to qualify as evaluation had 
the beneficial effect of giving wide berth to different 
conceptions of the evaluation enterprise. But it did 
not bring about a cohesive and principled stance 
about the social remit of the evaluation discipline.  
Given the unintended consequences associated 
with Scriven’s initial, highly adaptable, and 
permissive definition, it would be timely to promote 
a stricter meaning of evaluation. An explicit re-
definition of evaluation, legitimized by evaluation 
societies, would put forward the final integrative 
phase of the evaluation process at the centre of the 
discipline and recognize the crucial role of ethics in 
aggregating merit and worth assessments.  
 Delivering on this promise will not take place as 
long as doctrinal differences continue to fragment 
the evaluation community to the puzzlement of 
evaluation users and the public at large. To this 






Bringing Peace to a Divided House 
 
The current troubled state of the evaluation 
discipline grows out of a sustained confrontation 
between rival advocates of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Vicious paradigm wars have 
dominated evaluation history. An uneasy truce now 
prevails but skirmishes still erupt. A genuine 
rapprochement has proved elusive. This unsettled 
state-of-affairs undermines the credibility of the 
evaluation function in the public sphere.  
Pragmatic decision makers faced with urgent 
social problems cannot grasp what the fuss is about 
and increasingly seek comfort in the bland 
certainties offered by management consultants, 
auditors, and econometricians. It is high time for 
evaluators to put their house in order. 
Paradoxically, it is the very success of Campbell’s 
quantitative methods at the creation of the 
evaluation discipline that ignited the paradigm 
wars. 
The spurious claim that randomization is the 
evaluation gold standard brought forth a furious 
reaction from three sources: (i) anti-naturalists 
who argued that scientific methods are invalid in 
human affairs since social phenomena are unstable 
and variable across contexts; (ii) constructivists 
who asserted that the search for objectivity is futile 
since intentions, goals and values inevitably feed 
into socially constructed interpretations; and (iii) 
critical theorists who detected power machinations 
in the experimentalists’ knowledge construction 
strategies.  
Together these qualitative methods proponents 
elicited the rise of a dialogic, inclusive, and 
participatory wave of evaluation diffusion (Vedung, 
2010) that swelled in the 1970’s, a highly creative 
period in evaluation history. The pendulum swung 
back in the 1980’s when a neo-liberal wave engulfed 
the evaluation discipline. Soon thereafter, mostly 
through attrition, the paradigm wars abated as the 
evidence-based wave swelled in the 1990s.  Mixed 
methods were touted as the solution to the 
perennial inter-disciplinary conflict (Stern, Stame, 
Mayne, Forss, Davies, & Befani, 2012), but 
doctrinal divisions persist.  
The “randomistas” continue to pursue 
incontrovertible evidence of verifiable “results” 
while interpretative-qualitative studies and critical 
theory analyses flourish (Gage, 2009). The 
evaluation scene is now characterized by 
competitive turmoil under the big tent of a rapidly 
expanding and increasingly cosmopolitan 
evaluation movement (Chelimsky and Shadish, 
1997).   




More Evaluation Paradigms and Models (Adapted from Mertens & Wilson (2012, p. 41) 
Paradigm Branch Models Proponents 
Post-positivist Quantitative Experimental/Quasi-experimental                                      Tyler, Cook, Shadish, Rossi, Henry 
Constructivist Qualitative Responsive         Stake, Cronbach            
  Case Study Morra, Simons 
  Consumer-oriented         Scriven 
  Fourth Generation           Guba and Lincoln 
Pragmatic Use UFE/Developmental    Patton 
  Ratings and rubrics         Davidson 
  Cost benefit analysis Harberger, Squire 
Transformative Social Justice Empowerment Fetterman 
  Democratic McDonald, House &Howe 
  Social justice Mertens 
  Culturally sensitive Kirkhart 
 
 Given chronic inter-disciplinary tensions and 
rival doctrinal temperaments, Howe’s view (1988, 
p. 16) that “no incompatibility between quantitative 
and qualitative methods exists at either the level of 
practice or that of epistemology [so that] there are 
thus no good reasons for …researchers to fear 
forging ahead with ‘what works’” should be 
vigorously promoted. Public confidence in 
evaluation will remain elusive without mutual 
recognition within the evaluation community that 
rejecting the scientific method is self-defeating and 
that qualitative methods offer invaluable support to 
experimental methods. 
 
Mixed Methods Require Mixed Models 
 
Combining evaluation models would help 
implement the pragmatic, mixed methods 
approach to evaluation. Such a stance would not 
preclude the use of valid social experiments 
envisaged by the Popper/Campbell vision of an 
Open Society. But it would make clear to the wider 
public that evaluation is a serious knowledge 
occupation committed to the public interest.   
 Uneasy co-existence characterizes today’s 
highly fragmented evaluation market. Neither the 
qualitative nor the quantitative camp has prevailed. 
The wider public remains uncertain as to what 
evaluation stands for. By using practical 
consequences, i.e. impact, as the ultimate arbiter, 
mixed models would inspire ingenious 
methodological syntheses that would be gradually 
refined in line with the experimental thrust of the 
Open Society. 
 A host of evaluation models currently compete 
for attention and resources (Table 1). To secure 
broad based public support, collaboration among 
models rather than competition is called for. This 
would also enhance evaluation quality. Indeed, a 
judicious combination of models and instruments 
adapted to the context would enhance the validity 
of evaluation experiments.  
 Equally diverse methodological orientations 
among evaluation team members would help tap 
synergies. Different evaluation models (Table 2) 
address different questions and focus on different 
assessment criteria. They are complementary 
rather than antagonistic. Since they rely on 
different methods, they favour triangulation and 
facilitate cross-verification of findings. 
 
The Imperative of Independence 
 
Even if current doctrinal divisions are overcome, 
living up to the tighter definition of the evaluation 
mission, moving evaluation to a higher plane and 
achieving greater policy influence to strengthen the 
Open Society will not materialize without 
professionalisation. This will require significant 
shifts in evaluation policy directions and vigorous 
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implementation of the Global Evaluation Agenda 
universally endorsed as the culmination of the 2015 
Evaluation Year (Eval Partners, 2015).  
To perform their social duty as professionals 
committed to the Open Society, it will not be 
Table 2 
A Taxonomy of Evaluation Models 




Quasi-experimental                                      
Executive Directors, 
Managers, Economists 
 Merit Were the intended outcomes achieved and 
were they attributable to the intervention? 





Does the intervention reflect the diversity of 
stakeholders’ views? 
Case Study Program designers, 
sociologists, 
anthropologists 
Worth How do various intervention elements fit 
together to generate impact? 
Consumer Consumers, market 
researchers 
Worth, value   Does the product or service meet expectations 
at the right price? 
Fourth Generation Stakeholders, Critical 
theorists 
Significance Does the intervention reflect the full range of 
political, social, cultural factors?  
UFE/Developmental Decision makers, intended 
beneficiaries 
Merit Does the evaluation help improve the 
intervention for its sponsors?   




Does the intervention achieve its relevant goals 
efficiently in a sustainable fashion and with 
positive impacts? 
Cost benefit analysis Funders, citizens Value Does the intervention make effective use of 
scarce resources? 
Empowerment Neglected groups Worth Do beneficiaries have the tools and knowledge 
to evaluate their own performance? 
Democratic Citizens Worth, value, 
significance 
Does the evaluation promote inclusion, 
dialogue, and deliberation? 
Social justice Citizens Worth, value, 
significance 
Does the intervention address social validity, 
diversity, and human rights?  
Culturally sensitive Evaluators Worth, value Does the evaluator recognize the influence of 
culture on human behaviour? 
 
  
enough for evaluators to avoid technical blunders.  
Nor should it be enough for evaluators to observe 
current ethical guidelines issued by evaluation 
societies since they are largely limited to narrow 
professional ethics (validity, data access, privacy, 
respect for subjects, etc.).   
 To be sure, evaluation generates useful, timely 
and context dependent answers to a wide range of 
questions asked by decision makers. But incentives 
drive behavior and without structural 
independence, fee dependence acts as an 
instrument of control: it allows commissioners to 
shape terms of reference, influence data 
interpretation, define the meaning of collected 
evidence and censor evaluation findings.  
This leads us back to Campbell’s recognition 
(1998, op. cit., p. 36) that the existing political 
system seems “at times set up just so as to prevent 
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reality-testing” and his valid concern that 
evaluators are “apt to become unwittingly co-opted 
into a pervasive bias in favour of the already-
established governmental and extra-governmental 
powers who, after all, will usually be the source of 
our past and future salaries” (1998, p. 57).  
This is not to deny the important role that 
evaluation consultants (who use evaluation tools 
but are not independent evaluators) play and 
should continue to play in helping managers 
improve project and programme design and 
implementation: as was made clear earlier, 
bureaucratic evaluation has value, but only 
autocratic evaluation can stand up to the autocracy 
of vested interests.   
Just as independent auditors attest to the 
validity of financial accounts, independent 
evaluators should be routinely tasked with 
verification of self-evaluation claims by engaging 
stakeholders and focusing on the public interest.  
Evaluation societies have yet to press for 
reforms in the enabling environment within which 
evaluation currently takes place. Yet the legitimacy 
of evaluation as a public service hinges on the 
extent to which the commissioner’s values and 
interests are aligned with those of the citizenry.  
Only independent evaluation keeps the 
commissioner, the evaluand, and the evaluator at 
arm’s length.  
Promoting such a governance model as good 
practice would help adopt evaluation protocols that 
protect evaluation independence without incurring 
evaluator isolation. It would make use of the checks 
and balances that distribute authority between 
different branches of government (or between the 
owners and managers of a private or philanthropic 
organization). Only through structural or 
professional autonomy can the democratic deficit of 
evaluation as currently practiced be filled.  
Rising to the top of the occupational ladder 
through professionalization would also enhance 
evaluators’ influence. This requires not only 
nurturing ethical dispositions, orientation towards 
the public interest, responsibility for the quality of 
one’s work, expertise grounded in high quality 
education and exposure to practice but also 
autonomous control over the evaluator designation. 
Beyond professional development initiatives, 
oversight and accreditation mechanisms 
characteristic of well-established knowledge 
professions will have to be considered (Picciotto, 
2011). 
 Professional self-management would help to 
minimize the threats to evaluation integrity and 
quality caused by weak standards, capture by 
vested interests and state interference. It would 
require agreement on administrative rules, peer 
reviews of work quality; disciplining of errant 
members and in extreme cases stripping them of 
their designation.  These measures would involve 
risks associated with elitism and meritocracy. But 
such risks would be manageable by an invigorated 
and united evaluation community dedicated to 




The Open Society had a limited aim: to avoid the 
rise and perpetuation of autocracy. Popper’s 
conception of democracy was epistemological: a 
government dedicated to knowledge creation, 
respectful of dissent and open to change. This 
provided the right paradigm for an evaluation 
occupation on the march across sectoral and 
national borders. 
 Various approaches have been used to cater to 
the needs of policy makers in the diverse 
governance environments within which evaluators 
are called upon to operate. A flexible ethical stance, 
a carefully delineated professional remit, a 
predilection for assessing merit, a reluctance to 
engage in advocacy have characterized evaluative 
practice under the big tent of the evaluation 
occupation.  
 However, the Open Society is now under siege 
and evaluation should play its part in protecting it 
and promoting it. Beyond evaluation in democracy 
and democracy in evaluation, it is time to take 
reasoned steps towards evaluation for democracy. 
A pragmatic approach will be needed to tailor 
ambition to what is feasible in individual contexts, 
but the ultimate evaluation goal should not be in 
doubt: contributing to the Open Society to the 
maximum feasible extent.  
 This implies putting value, ethics, and the 
public interest at the very centre of the evaluation 
occupation; breaking free of the parsimonious 
piecemeal social engineering concept to embrace 
and inform systemic social reform; bringing peace 
to a methodologically divided house; systematic 
mixing of evaluation models; and the promotion of 
evaluation independence through 
professionalization. This is an ambitious change 
agenda but as Carol Weiss once remarked: 
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